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Abstract:
Purpose: We consider a dynamic duopoly market in which two firms respectively produce green
products and  conventional products. The two  types of  product can substitute each other in
some degree. Their  demand rates depend on not only prices but the consumers’  increasing
environmental awareness.  Too high initial cost relative to conventional products becomes one
of  the major obstacles that hinder the adoption of  green products. The government employs
subsidy  policy  to trigger  the  adoption of  green products.  The purpose of  the  paper  is  to
explore the optimal subsidy strategy to fulfill the government’s objective.
Design/methodology/approach: We suppose the players in the game employ open-loop strategies,
which  make  sense  since  the  government  generally  cannot  alter  his  policy  for  political  and
economic  purposes.  We take  a  differential  game  approach  and  use  backward  induction  to
analyze  the  firms’  pricing  strategy under  Cournot  competition,  and  then  focus  upon  a
Stackelberg equilibrium to find the optimal subsidy strategy of  the government. 
Findings: The results show that the more remarkable the energy or environmental performance,
or the bigger the initial cost of  green products, the higher the subsidy level should be. Due to
the  increasing  environmental  awareness  and  the  learning  curve,  the  optimal  subsidy  level
decreases over time.
-626-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.734
Research limitations/implications: In our model several simplifying assumptions are made to keep
the analysis more tractable. In particular, we have assumed only one type of  green product. In
reality several types of  product with different energy or environmental performances exist. Our
research can be extended in future work to take into account product differentiation on energy
or environmental performance and devise a discriminatory subsidy policy accordingly. 
Originality/value: In  the paper we set the objective of  the government as minimizing the total
social cost induced by the energy consumption or environmental side effect and government
expenditure. In addition, we assume the price of  conventional products is variable and examine
the  Cournot  competition between  the  two  firms.  This  study  can  provide  more  valuable
managerial insights into improving the design of  subsidy policy.
Keywords: price subsidy, Cournot competition, open-loop Stackelberg game, differential game
1. Introduction
The issues on energy conversation and environment protection are drawing more and more
attention from public institutions, firms and consumers. More social endeavor are devoted into
fields  of  green  design,  production  and  supply  chain  management  (See  Baines,  Brown,
Benedetettini & Ball, 2012; Luthra, Kumar, Kumar & Haleem, 2011 for more). Many firms have
innovated  and  developed  greener products  to  replace  conventional  products.  But  these
innovative  products  are  generally  priced  high  relative  to  conventional  products  due  to
enormous upfront R&D and production cost. Thus too high price becomes one of the major
obstacles that hinder the adoption of green products. For example, researches on many plug-in
hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) cost estimates suggest a cost premium of around 30-80% above
conventional vehicles.  A survey indicates that if PHEVs are available at a 15% cost premium
over conventional vehicles, they would significantly penetrate the vehicle market even without
a climate policy (Karplus, Paltsev & Reilly, 2010).
In order  to  reduce the energy consumption and environment pollution  and accelerate  the
market diffusion of environmentally friendly products, lots of countries are employing price
subsidy or taxes rebate instruments. For instance, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 provides a tax credit of $2500 per plug-in hybrid electric vehicle sold (requires at
least  4kWh  battery  capacity)  and  an  additional  $417  for  each  additional  kWh  of  battery
capacity in excess of 4kWh (capped at $7500 for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight less than
14,000lb) (Peterson &  Michalek, 2013). In  China from June, 2012 to May, 2013, household
inverter air conditioner per unit can get subsidy varying from 180 Yuan to 400 Yuan according
-627-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.734
to  different  cooling  capacities  and  energy  efficiencies  (Ministry  of  Finance  of  the  People’s
Republic of China, 2012). 
The government’s subsidy policy aims to reducing the actual price the consumers afford for the
green  product,  increasing  its  competitiveness,  and  accelerating  its  diffusion.  The  practical
effects of subsidy policy in some regimes are identified by some research. Zhang, Song and
Hamori (2011) construct panel data from an 11-year data set on all 47 prefectures of Japan,
covering  the  period  1996-2006,  and  use  this  data  set  to  analyze  the  factors  affecting
photovoltaic  (PV)  system diffusion.  Their  empirical  results  show  that  government  subsidy
policies  are seemingly  of  critical  importance  in  promoting  photovoltaic  system diffusion in
Japan. In Taiwan, two national incentive programs (1986-1991, 2000-present) are initiated by
the government to promote utilization of  solar  water heaters (SWHs). In general,  the two
subsidy programs are considered be the driving force on local market expansion and have a
drastic effect on popularization of SWHs in Taiwan (Chang, Lin, Lee & Chung, 2011).
A very successful  model on diffusion of innovation was  early  proposed by Bass (1969).  The
Bass model expresses change in cumulative sales over time in a new marketplace in which the
innovation is sold to first-time purchasers. In the model the cumulative sales depend on the
number of previous adopters and the total market potential. Later a number of researchers
have extended the Bass model in incorporating market competition combining variables such
as price, advertising and product characteristics (see Kim, Bridges & Srivastava, 1999; Peres,
Muller & Mahajan, 2010 for more). Game theory has been introduced into this research field.
For instance, Dockner and Jørgensen (1988) deal with the determination of optimal dynamic
pricing policies in an oligopolistic market using differential game theory, and analyze three
basic classes of sales dynamics: competition with price effects only, competition with price as
well as adoption effects, and competition with adoption effects only. Levin, McGill and Nediak
(2009) provide insights about equilibrium price dynamics under different levels of competition,
asymmetry between firms, and multiple market segments with varying properties.
Some authors theoretically analyze the impacts of subsidy instrument. Kalish and Lilien (1983)
propose a model to investigate analytically the effects of a price subsidy over time on the rate
of market diffusion. The model considers word-of-mouth effects and learning curve. The results
show that if there is positive diffusion effect, price increases in time, while if market saturation
causes demand to decline over time price decreases in time. Cesare and Liddo (2001) state the
subsidy problem as a leader-follower game by introducing an additional decision variable to the
firm: the advertising effort. 
How does the government subsidy influence the price of the green products? Subsidies raise
buyers’ willingness-to-pay, and by itself this might cause firms to charge higher prices (Orzen
& Sefton, 2003). The higher price might counteract the effect of the subsidy policy. Jørgensen
and  Zaccour  (1999) deal  with  a  problem of  a  government  that  wishes to  maximize  the
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cumulative sale of the green technology sold to private households by the terminal date of the
government program. Jørgensen and Zaccour (1999) extend previous studies by introducing
guaranteed buys and a substitute product (an existing technology), and find out (in the case of
a constant price of the alternative technology) that an optimal subsidy rate is decreasing over
time.  Based  on  an  environmentally  differentiated  products  model,  Toshimitsu (2010)  has
shown a paradoxical case generated by a consumer-based environmental subsidy where the
subsidy policy degrades the environment and is (not) socially optimal if the marginal social
valuation  of  environmental  damage is  sufficiently  small  (large,  respectively).  Cantono  and
Silverberg (2009) set up a network model of new technology diffusion that combines contagion
among consumers with heterogeneity of agent characteristics. They argue that the introduction
of a subsidy policy seems to be highly effective for a given high initial price level only for
learning economies in a certain range. Lorentziadis  and Vournas (2011) develop a model to
determine  the  required  subsidy  in  order  to  achieve  a  specific  replacement  target  of  old
polluting  vehicles  within  a certain  time framework,  and  derive  the required subsidy  level,
replacement rate and program duration. 
Jørgensen and Zaccour (1999), Cantono and Silverberg (2009) and Lorentziadis and Vournas
(2011) consider the case that the alternative technology has a constant price and leave out the
impact of the subsidy on the price adjustment of the alternative technology. In practice the
occurrence of government subsidy change the market competition status and the new situation
undoubtedly influences the price of the old technology. Therefore we should take into account
the interactions  between the two technologies and pricing  dynamics.  We assume that the
green products and alternative technology can substitute in  some degree and the price of
conventional products changes quite dynamically over the competition situation.
In most previous studies the objectives of the government are to achieve the amount target
that the green products sell in fixed period by given budget. This might lead to such a paradox
as the subsidy policy degrades the environment shown in Toshimitsu (2010). The reason partly
lies in that the government subsidy reduces the price of green products so that they can sell
more.  The  increasing  sales  volume  offsets  the  reduction  of  energy  consumption  per  unit
energy saving product. In our paper we set the objective of the government as minimizing the
total  social  cost  induced  by  the  energy  consumption  of  the  products  and  government
expenditure. The purpose of the paper is to explore the optimal subsidy strategy to fulfill the
government’s objective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the set-up is laid out. Section 3
formulates the Stackelberg differential game to find the equilibrium. Section 4 presents an
illustrative example  to show how  the optimal  price and subsidy vary with time. Section 5
concludes.
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2. The set-up
We consider a duopoly market in which one firm produces  green products and another firm
produces conventional products. The two types of product satisfy consumers’ same needs, that
is to say, they can substitute each other in some degree.  Let  subscript  i and j denote green
products  and conventional  products  separately in  this  work.  Similar  to  the linear demand
function used by Cellini  and Lambertini (2002), we suppose the demand rates at time  t of
green products and conventional products are respectively
)()()()( tptpttx jiiiii γβα +−=
•
(1)
)()()()( tptpttx ijjjjj γβα +−=
•
(2)
Where x(t) denotes the market cumulative sales of the products from continuous time 0 t to
and p(t) denotes the price at the time t. Coefficients α and γ are positive constants. Coefficient
γ  represents the degree of substitutability between green products and conventional products.
Coefficient β(t)  varies with  the  time  and  incorporates the  consumers’  environmental
awareness. As environmental awareness increases continually, the consumers are more willing
to buy green products even if they have to pay more (Conrad, 2005). Thus the price elasticity
of the products is invariable no longer and furthermore we have 
∂ β i( t )
∂ t
<0 , 
∂ β j( t )
∂ t
>0 . We
assume  βi(t)βj(t) – γiγj > 0  to  make sure that  the prices and sales  of  two types of  product
maintain positive. 
Considering learning curve and scale effect  we suppose that unit  cost of the two  types of
product  decreases  with  the  increasing  production  volume,  Ci(t) = ci0 – cixi(t),
Cj(t) = cj0 – cjxj(t), where ci0, cj0, ci and cj are positive constants, and ci0 > cj0, which means the
unit cost of green products is higher than conventional products at the time 0. 
At the beginning of entering into market, the green products are at a disadvantage when
competing with conventional products due to higher cost. Since the green products consume
less  resources  and  energy,  and  have  less  side  effects  on  environment,  the  government
subsidize the consumers buying the green products s(t) per unit of green product to stimulate
its market diffusion. The subsidy program proceeds from time 0 to T. When making subsidy
policy,  the  government  cannot  disregard the  response  of  the  firm producing  conventional
products. The subsidy as the equivalent of the price reduction of green products no doubt
leads to the price adjustment of the conventional products. Demand and cost of the two types
of product vary as the time goes on. Given the subsidy s(t) each firm will certainly adjust their
price considering the opponent’s response in order to maximize his own profit.
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Let S(t) denotes the cumulative subsidy expenditure of the government during the period from
time 0 to t. Then we have dttxtsTS
T
i∫ •= 0 )()()( , S(0) = 0. The objective of the government
is  to  minimize  the  total  social  cost,  min Jg = qixi(T) + qjxj(T) + S(T),  where  qi and qj
respectively refer to the social cost incurred by energy consumption and environment impact
of unit green product and conventional product. The social cost can be calculated according to
the  report  by  World  Bank (Sadeghi  &  Ameli,  2012). Coefficient  q reflects  energy  or
environmental performance of the products. A less q means a better energy or environmental
performance of the products. It is clear that qi < qj.
We suppose  the players in  the game employ  open-loop strategies.  Since  the  government
generally  cannot  alter  his  policy  for  political  and  economic  purposes  we  can  assume  he
creditably precommits to its subsidy policy. Thus the firms make their decisions at the initial
instant of the time and can stick to it unchangeably. So the open-loop supposition makes sense
in this scenario.
3. The Stackelberg differential game model
In our Stackelberg game model the government takes the leader’ role and the firms play the
followers’ role. When making subsidy policy, the government must estimate beforehand the
price adjustment of the firms responding to the subsidy and the consumers’ demand change.
Given the government’s subsidy policy, the two firms compete over prices. We can first use the
backward induction to find the firms’ pricing strategy under Cournot competition and then
derive the government’s optimal subsidy level.
3.1. The optimal pricing strategy of green products
The government subsidize the consumers that buy the green products  s(t) per unit of green
product from time 0 to time T. After the implementation of subsidy policy the demand rate at
the time t can be written as
)()]()()[()( tptstpttx jiiiii γβα +−−=
•
(3)
)]()([)()()( tstptpttx ijjjjj −+−=
•
γβα (4)
Considering  the  subsidy  duration  is  generally  not  long,  we  disregard the  discount  rate
(Jørgensen &  Zaccour,  1999).  The  objective  of  the  firm  producing green  products  is  to
maximize his profit from time 0 to T, 
max J i=∫0
T
[αi−β i( t )( pi( t )−s( t ) )+ γi p j( t ) ]( pi( t )−c i
0+c i xi ( t ))dt
0)(.. >tpts i
(5)
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We formulate Hamiltonian function of the firm producing green products 
))]()(()()([)]())()()(([
))()](())()()(([ 0
tstptpttptstpt
xcctptptstptH
ijjjj
j
ijiiii
i
i
iiiijiiiii
−+−++−−
++−+−−=
γβαλγβαλ
γβα
(6)
where λii and λjj are costate variables respectively associated with state variable xi(t) and xj(t).
The costate equations are
)()]()()()()([ txctptsttptc
x
H
iijiiiiii
i
ii
i
••
−=++−−=
∂
∂
−= γββαλ (7)
0=
∂
∂
−=
•
j
ij
i x
Hλ (8)
Using Equations (7) and (8) yields λii(t) = -cixi(t) + di, λij(t) = ei, where di and ei are constants
to  be  determined  later.  From  transversality conditions λii(T) = 0,  λij(T) = 0,  we  can  obtain
di =cixi(T), ei = 0. 
The Hamiltonian maximization condition is
0))()()()()((
))()(( 0
=+++−
+++−−=
∂
∂
j
j
ijiiiii
i
iiiiii
i
i
tptsttpt
xcctpt
p
H
γλγββα
λβ
(9)
From Equation (9) we can derive 
iiiijiiii dcttptsttpt αβγββ +−=−− ))(()()()()()(2 0 (10)
3.2. The optimal pricing strategy of conventional products
The firm producing conventional products aims to 
dttxcctptstptptJ jjjj
T
ijjjjj )]()())][()(()()([max
0
0
+−−+−= ∫ γβα
0)(.. >tpts j
(11)
The Hamiltonian function of the firm is given by 
))]()(()()([)]())()()(([
))())](()(()()([ 0
tstptpttptstpt
xcctptstptptH
ijjjj
j
jjiiii
i
j
jjjjijjjjj
−+−++−−
++−−+−=
γβαλγβαλ
γβα
(12)
where λji and λjj are costate variables. 
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The costate equations are 
0=
∂
∂
−=
•
i
ji
j x
Hλ (13)
)())]()(()()([ txctstptptc
x
H
jjijjjjj
j
ij
j
••
−=−+−−=
∂
∂
−= γβαλ (14)
Using  Equations  (13)  and  (14)  yields  λji(t) = ej,  λji(t) = –cjxj(t) + dj,  where  ej and  dj are
constants to be determined later. From transversality conditions λji(T) = 0,  λji(T) = 0, we can
obtain dj = cjxj(T), ej = 0. 
The Hamiltonian maximization condition is
0))]()(()()([
))()(( 0
=+−+−
+++−−=
∂
∂
i
i
jijjjj
j
jjjjjj
j
j
tstptpt
xcctpt
p
H
γλγβα
λβ
(15)
Equation (13) shows that 
jjjjijjjj dcttptstpt αβγγβ +−=−+ ))(()()()()(2 0 (16)
Let superscript * denote the value of a variable in equilibrium. We have
Proposition 1. The optimal prices of green products and conventional products are given by
the following equations respectively,
]}))(()[(2
]))(([)())()(2{(
)()(4
1)(
0
0
iiiij
jjjjijiji
jiji
i
dctt
dcttstt
tt
tp
αββ
αβγγγββ
γγββ
+−
++−+−
−
=
∗
 (17)
]}))(([
]))(()[(2)()({
)()(4
1)(
0
0
iiiij
jjjjiji
jiji
j
dct
dctttst
tt
tp
αβγ
αββγβ
γγββ
+−
++−+−
−
=
∗
(18)
Proof. By simultaneously solving  Equations (10) and (16), we can easily get  Eqs. (17) and
(18).
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Since we have  βiβj – γiγj > 0,  Equations  (17) and (18)  imply that  14
2
0 <
−
−
=
∂
∂
<
∗
jiji
jijii
s
p
γγββ
γγββ
,
0
4
<
−
−
=
∂
∂ ∗
jiji
jij
s
p
γγββ
γβ
. From the comparative analysis we can find out 
• The  government’s  subsidy  induces  the  increase  of  green products’  price,  and  the
increase degree is less than the subsidy level. The actual price the consumers afford
declines. 
• The firm producing conventional products will reduce its price so as to compete against
the component and maintain his competitive advantage.
Substituting Equations (17) and (18) into Equations (3) and (4), we can get the demand rate
of the two types of product at time t,
]))(([
)()(4
)(
]))(([
)()(4
)()(2
)()(
)()(4
)()(2
)(
0
0
jjjj
jiji
ii
iiii
jiji
jiji
i
jiji
jiji
ii
dct
tt
t
dct
tt
tt
tst
tt
tt
tx
αβ
γγββ
γβ
αβ
γγββ
γγβββ
γγββ
γγββ
α
+−
−
++−
−
−
−
−
−
+=
•
(19)
]))(([
)()(4
)(
]))(([
)()(4
)()(2
)(
)()(4
)()(
)(
0
0
iiii
jiji
jj
jjjj
jiji
jiji
jiji
jji
jj
dct
tt
t
dct
tt
tt
ts
tt
tt
tx
αβ
γγββ
γβ
αβ
γγββ
γγββ
γγββ
γββ
α
+−
−
++−
−
−
−
−
−=
•
(20)
Differentiate  with  respect  to  subsidy in  Equations  (19)  and  (20), we  can  obtain
0)(
)()(4
)()(2)(
>
−
−
=
∂
∂
•
t
tt
tt
s
tx
i
jiji
jijii β
γγββ
γγββ
,  0
)()(4
)()()(
<
−
−=
∂
∂
•
jiji
jjij
tt
tt
s
tx
γγββ
γββ
. The results show that
the demand rate of green products increases with the increasing subsidy level, and conversely
the demand rate of conventional products shrinks with the increasing subsidy level.
3.3. The optimal subsidy strategy
The problem the  government  faces  is  how to  determine the  optimal  subsidy  in  order  to
accomplish his objective, namely min Jg. The government’s Hamiltonian function can be written
as:
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))]()(()()()[(
)]())()()(()[)((
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tptstptcts
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ijjjj
j
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j
g
jiiii
i
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g
g
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g
j
j
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g
g
gj
j
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i
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−+−−
++−−−+=
++++=
∗∗
∗∗
•••••
γβαφλ
γβαφλλ
λφλφλλλ
(21)
The costate equations are:
0
)(
=∂
∂
−=
•
tS
H gg
gλ (22)
jiji
jjiij
gj
j
g
jiji
jiji
ii
i
gi
g
g
i
g
i
gi
g
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c
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tt
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H
γγββ
γββφλ
γγββ
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−
−
+
−
−
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∂
∂
−=
•
)()(4
)()(
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)()(4
)()(2
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(23)
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jiji
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j
gj
j
g
jiji
ijiji
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g
g
i
g
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g
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ttc
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tx
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γγββ
γγβββφλ
γγββ
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−
−
−
−
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•
)()(4
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)()(
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(24)
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jjij
gj
j
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jiji
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g
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i
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g
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tt
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γγββ
γββφλ
γγββ
γγβββφλλλφ
−
−
+
−
−
−+−=
∂
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−=
•
)()(4
)()(
)(
)()(4
)()(2
))((
(25)
jiji
jiji
j
j
gj
j
g
jiji
ijii
gi
g
g
i
gj
j
gj
g
tsts
tsts
c
tsts
tsts
cts
H
γγββ
γγβββφλ
γγββ
γββφλλλφ
−
−
−
−
−
−+=
∂
∂
−=
•
)()(4
)()(2
)(
)()(4
)()(
))((
(26)
Equation (22) shows that λgg is a constant. From transversality conditions λgg(T) = 1, we can
obtain λgg = 1.
Using  Equations (23)  to (26)  yields  
••
=
i
gi
i
g c φλ ,  
••
=
j
gj
j
g c φλ .  From  transversality conditions
λgi(T) = qi, λgj(T) = qj , ϕgi(T) = 0, ϕgj(T) = 0, we can get λgi – ciϕgi = qi, λgj – cjϕgj = qj.
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Necessary optimality conditions for the government's problem yields
0
)()(4
)()(
)(
)()(4
)()(2
)()(
)]())()(([
=
−
−
−+
−
−
−+
++−−=
∂
∂
∗∗
jiji
jjij
gj
j
g
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g
i
g
jiiii
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g
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tt
c
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tt
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tptstp
s
H
γγββ
γββφλ
γγββ
γγβββφλλ
γβαλ
(27)
Proposition 2. The optimal subsidy of the government is given by 
])()(2[2
))(()(2
)(
2
1
])()(2[2
)(
2
1)(
0
0
jiji
jijjjiij
ii
j
jiji
jj
i
tt
dctt
dc
q
tt
t
qts
γγββ
αγβγαβ
γγββ
γβ
−
+−+
−−
+
−
+−=∗
(28)
Where di = cixi(T), dj = cjxj(T).
Proof. Substituting  λgg = 1,  λgi – ciϕgi = qi ,  λgj – cjϕgj = qj into  Equation  (27),  we  obtain
Equation (28).
In Equation (28), di and dj are unknown so far. We can substitute Equation (28) into Equations
(17) and (18) and then solve differential equations to obtain di and dj, and make it satisfy the
constraints di = cixi(T), dj = cjxj(T).
Equation (26) implies that 
2
1
−=
∂
∂ ∗
iq
s
, 0)2(2
>
−
=
∂
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jiji
jj
jq
s
γγββ
γβ
, 
2
1
0 =∂
∂ ∗
ic
s
. Some insights can
be summarized as follows:
• The better the energy or environmental performance of green products, the higher the
subsidy level should be. Thus the subsidy can further reduce the actual price that the
consumers  afford  and  weaken  the  price  advantage  of  conventional  products.  The
subsidy should increase with the decreasing energy or environmental performance of
conventional products.
• The higher the initial cost of green products, the more the subsidy should be. Thus the
subsidy policy can rapidly incur scale effect, reduce the cost of green products and
raise its market competitiveness.
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4. Numerical analysis 
This section uses an example to illustrate the proposed model. Let the demand rate functions
of  green  products  and  conventional  products  respectively  be:
)(6.0)(20)( 01.0 tptpetx ji
t
i +−= −
•
,  )(5.0)(18)( 01.0 tptpetx ij
t
j +−=
•
,  and unit  cost functions
be Ci(t) = 80 – 0.2xi(t),  Cj(t) = 60 – 0.2xj(t). The objective of the government is to  minimize
Jg = xi(T) + 1.5xj(T) + S(T).  Using  parameters  above and  Equation (28)  we  can  get  the
expression of subsidy s(t). Then substituting expression of subsidy s(t) into Equations (19) and
(20)  yields two  differential  equations.  Let  T = 30.  Using  initial  conditions xi(0) = 0 and
xj(0) = 0, and solving the two differential equations we can obtain xi(T) and xj(T). Substituting
known xi(T) and  xj(T) into  Equations  (17),  (18)  and  (28),  we  can  get
s*(t) = 18.457 – 9.361e0.01t,  pi*(t) = 39.813 – 8.478e0.01t,  pj*(t) = 10.689 + 9.845e-0.01t.  The
optimal price and subsidy trajectories are shown in Figure 1. From the figure we can see that
the optimal subsidy as well as optimal prices of the two kinds of products decreases as time
goes on. The results stem from that on one side the unit cost decreases and on the other the
consumers’ environmental awareness increase gradually. 
Substituting  s*(t),  pi*(t) and  pj*(t) into  )(6.0))()((20)( 01.0 tptstpetx ji
t
i +−−= −
•
,
))()((5.0)(18)( 01.0 tstptpetx ij
t
j −+−=
•
 yields  specific  expressions  of  the  two  types  of
product’s demand rates  )(tx i
•
 and  )(tx j
•
. Figure 2 shows how the demand rates of green
products  and  conventional  products  change  over  time.  We can find  that  on one  side  the
demand rate of green products increases as time goes on, and on the other side the demand
rate of conventional products decreases dramatically. The underlying reason has much more to
do  with  the  combined  action  of  the  consumers’  increasing  environmental  awareness  and
governmental subsidy policy.
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Figure 1. Optimal price and subsidy trajectories over time
Figure 2. Demand rates over time of two types of product
5. Conclusions
We consider a  dynamic  duopoly market in which two  types of product,  green products and
conventional products, compete over price. The government subsidizes the consumers that
purchase the green product in order to trigger its adoption. We have taken a differential game
approach to analyze the firms’ pricing response on government’s subsidy and focus upon an
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium to find the optimal subsidy policy. The results show that the
more remarkable the energy saving effect, or the bigger the initial cost of green products, the
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higher the subsidy level should be. Due to the increasing environmental awareness and the
learning curve, the optimal subsidy level decreases with the time. The conclusions have an
important implication to policy maker. 
In our model several simplifying assumptions are made to keep the analysis more tractable. In
particular, we have assumed only one type of green product, so we examine a uniform policy.
In reality several types of product with different energy and environmental performances exist.
It must be left to further research to take into account product differentiation on energy and
environmental performance and devise a discriminatory subsidy policy accordingly. 
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